Direct intuition: Strategies of knowledge in the Phenomenology of Life, with reference to the Philosophy of Illumination. by Louchakova-Schwartz, Olga
Direct Intuition: Strategies of Knowledge 
in the Phenomenology of Life, with Reference 
to the Philosophy of Illumination 
Olga Louchakova-Schwartz 
Abstract This article presents phenomenological meta-analysis of Tymieniecka's 
phenomenology of life with regard to its strategies of knowledge. The novelty of 
phenomenology of life consists in special orientation of direct intuition of 
Tymieniecka's insight. The analysis suggests that the positioning of the direct 
intuition differes from philosopher to philosopher. Even though this perspective 
pays attention to individual differences in philosophical thinking, this view has to 
be distinguished froll1 psychologism as criticized by Husser!. and rather, seen as a 
development of Husserl 's lheory of direct intuition. A framework for such analysis 
can be also found in Islamic philosophies of Suhrawardi and Ibn 'Arabi, who 
introduced the concepts of individual predisposition, modes of knowledge, and 
self-knowledge mediated by knowledge by presence. These concepts can be 
applied to understanding of the origins of philosophical insight. The paper exam-
ines in depth the workings of direct, or presentive, intuition in Tymieniecka's 
descriptions of the phenomenal field of life, and of life per se as a dynamic object. 
It demonstrates the dialogical nature of interrogation, and the sentience of logos 
as a horizon of philosophical inquiry. Finally, the paper introduces the concept of 
process phenomenology, and suggests directions of future research with regard to 
phenomenology of imagination. 
As many have noled, the phenomenology of life introduces not only a new philo-
sophical program but alsu a radical reformulation of the postmodern paradigm. J 
While the intellectual genealogy of Tymieniecka's thought is in line with both 
Leibnitz and Husserl, Tymieniecka's vision is unique and fresh. She recreates phi-
losophy in two steps: first is the all-encompassing epoche on preceding philosophi-
cal principles, and second is the radiating expanse of new philosophical categories. 
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This new intellectual landscape emerges out of an analytic reflection on the 
intuitions of life. Life is the starting point of Tymieniecka's analysis, the evidence 
for the scientific philosophical method, and the overarching horizon of phenome-
nological inquiry. Returning to things themselves in the phenomenology of life 
consists in the phenomenon of life as primary evidence; it entails an analysis of 
consciousness, perception, language, body etc. as consequential to life's tenden-
cies, processes, contents, and structures. 
Tymieniecka approaches life through the philosophical inquiry that she calls 
interrogation. Direct intuition and reason in her work are neither antagonistic nor 
working in tandem, in an unusual manner, they serves as a joint, undifferentiated 
cognitive faculty. I intend to show that interrogation, as uses a combined intuition-
reason as a single higher-order faculty, the logos of interrogation. 
The phenomenology of life provides a resolution for millennia-old aporiae of 
mind and matter, subject and object, and existence and essence. This philosophy is 
also effective in addressing the tricky issues of cognition and representation, and 
the ontology of the particular and the universal. In larger contexts ofTymieniecka 's 
concept of the unity-of-all-there-is-alive, previously insoluhle contradictions seem 
to be no more than artifacts of particular discourses, or even evidence of C1YOrS in 
philosophical judgment. 2 
After nearly 3,000 years of a history of philosophical ideas, one would expect 
that "there is nothing new under the sun.") Nevertheless, Tymieniecka's reforma-
tional insight is radical in its originality. A question thus arises: How does this 
philosopher attain such an insight? Can it be a matter of method? Tymieniecka not 
only refutes such technicalities but also maintains that the reduction of philosophy 
to a method have been a cause of misunderstandings and errors.4 Tymieniecka is not 
averse to limited methodological self-reflections: she self-reflects on the generative 
synthesis of direct intuition and description, scientific investigation, analysis of 
transcendental constitution, and traditional ontology in her work.' Although these 
approaches are present in her work, Tymieniecka's insight comes forth as much 
more than a result of the formal application of these approaches. Hers is a whole 
new strategy of knowledge, initiated by the original positioning of Tymieniecka's 
concept of direct intllition. 
I have to give this new concept, positioning of the direct intuition, some context. In 
Western phenomenology, Husser! developed the theory of direct intuition. This theory, 
even though it acknowledges the various types of intuition, is essentially universalistic, 
as expressed in the concept of noema-noes;s. I believe that there is not simply one 
single possibility but rather a number of possibilities in the noesis-l1oema relation-
ship. In order to prove my thesis, I will draw upon a different phenomenological 
tradition, that of Islamic existentialism, as typology of the modes of knowledge in the 
twelfth-century Akbarian and illuminationist philosophies gives me the chance to 
build the necessary analytic framework. 
Reaching out to twelfth-century Islamic metaphysics for a philosophical 
framework is not a mattcr of finding some hidden medieval quality in 
Tymieniecka's thought. On the contrary, her system is informed by the discover-
ies of the natural sciences and novel even by the standards of postmodernism. 6 
Consequently, this possibility of comparisons with Islamic philosophy is a matter 
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of a certain intellectual affinity that, when recognized, assists in the clarification 
of thought. As in the case of a figure and its background. the thing itself emerges 
out of juxtaposition. 
On the Modes of Knowledge 
Epistemology traditionally divides knowledge according to origin, structure, or 
kind. e.g. logical or intuitive knowledge. These are eidetic types, highly abstracted 
from experience. The downside of categorizing knowledge in such manner consists 
in a loss of the particular and an overlooking of the typology of knowledge con-
nected with human individual types. By contrast, epistemology in Islamic meta-
physics embraces both the universals of knowledge and the particulars of 
differences in personal constitution. In his famous analysis of the modes of knowl-
the Sufi philosopher Ibn 'ArabI examines such differences through phenome-
nological hermeneutic analyses of stories from the Old Testament. His doctrine of 
wahdad al-wlIjud (Arabic "unicity of being") establishes the ontological unity of 
existence as the real and the truth (Arabic al-haq). Reality comes through in 27 
modes of knowledge, each of which delivers a specific gestalt of unity depending on 
the qualities of the individual qualities of the prophet. 
Since prophets formulate spiritual and moral norms for their communities, the 
prophetic modes of knowledge (also known as modes of witnessing the real) reflect 
the predominant type of awareness in their societies. From the Sufi perspective. 
history is a sequence of the modes of witnessing. This idea resonates with the 
contemporary view that every paradigm has its leading thinkers who summarize and 
define main aspects of knowledge. The shift of the starting point of philosophy from 
consciousness to life presents a fundamental reorientation in the paradigm of knowl-
edge and in the mode of witnessing. 
A particular mode of knowledge takes on a three-way expression, as works. or 
activities that manifest noble character traits; as states. or the inner expression of 
invisible realities; and as knowledge, or direct perception of the modalities of real-
ity. There property of the self that underlies these expressions with of the real is 
known as predisposition (Arabic isti'd6d).7 It is possible to make a connection 
between Ibn 'ArabI's notion of predisposition and Suhrawardi's concept of knowl-
edge by presence. In the philosophy of illumination. knowledge by presence is the 
immediate apprehension through which the mind knows what exists within it eeL 
Husserl's noesis.) All cognition depends on knowledge by presence, including 
objectless self-awareness and knowledge of objects. from real objects by their rep-
resentations in the mind, to purely imaginal or eidetic objects. 
Ontologically, Suhrawardi maintains that pure consciousness/awareness/knowl-
edge by presence belongs to the same family of manifestations as physical light. 
Thus, his theory of knowledge by presence examines the transition from subjectivity 
to the physical world, from pure awareness to the zone where awareness seizes 
its object and (in Husserlian terms) the noesis becomes the l1oema. In oral Sufism, 
there are references to the spectrum of states of union related to a fluid positioning 
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of awareness on the cusp of subject and object. There is a typology of character 
involved in the generation of such states." 
This liminal zone of experience, which is hardly accessible for awareness, is not 
explored in Western phenomenological philosophy. For such a poorly researched 
matter. it would be unwise to ignore the data from other knowledge systems that are 
based on the direct apperception of self-consciousness, even if these systems are 
not strictly philosophical in a traditional sense. With regard to individual predisposi-
tion, the relationship on the cusp of pure awareness and objects is also examined in 
Buddhism.9 The idea that awareness has a certain positioning. a kind of angle within 
which it sees things, is also expressed in Carlos Castaneda's series of American 
Indian-inspired anthropological novels. Both Suhrawardi and Ibn 'ArabI insist 
awareness has universal aspects and is particularized according to one's mental con-
stitution. lO This particular position of awareness is not optional for the ego but 
constitutive. 
With such encouraging evidence, it is possible to trace the influences of individual 
mental constitution in the formation of phenomenological philosophy.'1 Every 
philosophical phenomenological system claims universality, but the path to universals, 
which is direct intuition, is positioned ditlerently from philosopher to philosopher. 
It is the angle of vision, the positioning of awareness, or. in Sufi terms, the predis-
position of the heart that defines which shape the phenomenological landscape will 
take, and how the real or truth will appear and be articulated by a particular knower. 
Minds, even enlightened minds, differ in their direct intuitions; were it not so, phe-
nomenological systems would exactly replicate one anothee" 
The Varieties of Direct Intuition 
Knowledge in phenomenology is obtained through the awareness of the contents of 
the mind by means of direct apprehension or apperception of the mental phenomena 
in the same mind. Husserl's theory of intentionality justified the use of direct intu-
ition as a means of knowledge. In his early work on direct intuition, Husser! did not 
view the ego pole as essential in the flOClIla-IlOesis relationship. Suhrawardi, on the 
contrary. incorporates the ego as an agent in any knowledge, arguing that direct 
intuition-based self-knowledge is a prerequisite of any knowledge. A similar posi-
tion is taken by Levinas iII his analysis of Husserl's theory: as hc remarked, "a 
description of the structure of consciousness and of intentionahty cannot overlook 
the personal character of consciousness."'3 Levinas further argues that the personal 
character of consciousness is defined by the presence of the ego pole in all intentional 
acts. Indeed. in the later writings of Husser! ego appears as an irreducible element 
of conscious life, a center of judgment. attention, assertion, negation. synthesis, 
and other spontaneous activities. However, the above-mentioned exclusion of the 
ego pole from the constitution of intentional relations leads to the maximum possible 
abstraction of relations in the process of knowing: all personal differences will be lost 
in overreduction. 
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On the contrary, in the direct intuition-based approach to knowledge in 
twelfth-century Islamic metaphysics, overreduction is avoided, and the individual 
predisposition expresses itself in differences in the modes of knowledge. 
Furthermore, when direct intuition is used as an epistemological tool in phil-
osophical phenomenological inquiry, spontaneous noetic activity undergoes 
modification. While always present in the background of the mind, noema-noesis 
relationships should be highlighted in one's awareness in the phenomenological 
method; this happens only if a change in self-awareness brings these relationship 
out of anonymity. 14 The subjective experience of direct intuition consists in con-
scious awareness with regard to the acts of intentional consciousness. The degree of 
this awareness differs from person to person. It is well known in the practice of 
Buddhism, Hesychasm, and Sufism that awareness of the internal constitution of the 
phenomenal field is a tool for self-knowledge and that it can be enhanced by 
spiritual exercises or meditation training. 15 In other words, the direct intuition of 
phenomenological method differs in its degree from person to person. 
Working off the datum of her experience, the phenomenological philosopher 
uses direct intuition as an instrument applied to the subject of her scientific research, 
the phenomenal field where she aspires to see things as they are in themselves. Toward 
a similar goal, natural science aspires to remove the influence of the observer. In the 
science of phenomenology, such a removal is not possible, as direct intuition is both 
the essence of the subjective self and the instrument of knowledge. The phenomeno-
logical procedures of epoche or reduction serve such a goal of attaining objectiv-
ity by minimizing the influence of the mental environment. Epoche frees both 
prereflective phenomena and direct intuition from the influence of opinions, beliefs 
and personal history. 
Both Husser! in his phenomenology and Suhrawardi in his philosophy of illu-
mination demonstrated that direct intuition is both the essence of self-awareness 
and is pervasive to the whole phenomenal field. Thus, direct intuition is founda-
tional to the functioning of the mind. The mind being a system of relations, it is hard 
to imagine that the functioning of direct intuition is constitution-free. In an ideal 
scenario, the personal psychological horizon is bracketed out of disciplined 
reflection. Further, reduction may extend so far as to eliminate the whole constituted 
self, with its particular self-awareness and spontaneous foci of attention, memory, 
and judgment, and its overall temporal and spatial dimensions. The residue of such 
a reduction is the purified direct intuition, which is the pure essence of conscious-
ness, devoid of any qualities. 16 However, consciousness is hardly ever experienced 
as pure. In most cases, pure consciousness is an abstract idea, or even an artifact of 
the method of reduction. 17 The notion of pure consciousness serves well in con-
structing one's theory of mind but is never the reality of the empirical psyche: the 
two belong to different orders of being. In the reality of experience, both the 
intuitive apperception of the phenomenal field and eidetic reduction take place in 
the context of numerous individual constitutive influences, and the unique individu-
ality of the mind as a whole configures the process. 
This emphasis on the fact that the direct intuition is not an isolated agent in the 
ideal mental universe but is always embedded in rich, fluid contexts of the whole mind 
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has to be distinguished from the position of cognitive relativism. The latter maintai ns 
that cognition must always be defined by belief or opinion. Different from belief 
or opinion, which define truth according to cognitive relativism, predisposition-
which influences the properties of direct intuition-is defining cognition more than 
reflective thinking. Tf belief or opinion can be bracketed out, predisposition cannot 
be: first, because it is predominantly anonymous and is difficult to access by awareness 
(see the previous section), and second. because bracketing it out would mean the 
loss of all self-awareness, and with it of all possibility of knowledge. IK Paraphrasing 
Heidegger's metaphor of the forest in the spirit of Suhrawardi's illuminationism. 
one can compare this situation with the light in the forest. The degree and quality of 
light depend on the positioning of the trees, on the location of the sun in its daily 
cycle, on overcast conditions, hut above all on the self-luminosity of the sun. If there 
is no sun, then the forest is in uttcr darkness. 
Since I am examining the psychological contexts of direct intuition, Husser]'s 
critique of psychologism has to be mentioned here. Husser! critiques the thesis that 
essential laws of logic are psychological propcrties, causally connected with prior 
experience. (Cf. Hanna on epistemic empiricism.)19 However, my argument concerns 
not logic but, rather, phenomenological direct intuition. Moreover. logic in psychologism 
is addressed in the natural attitude, whereas both Husser!'s critique and my analysis 
are both conducted in an attitude of phenomenological reduction. Without epoche, the 
individual aspects of direct intuition that I am pointing to would be invisible. 
Direct intuition should be also distinguished from the faculty of intuition as a 
psychological property and a variable in psychological research.)O The psychologi-
cal faculty of intuition is identified empirically and studied by means of testing or 
cognitive experiment. By contrast, direct intuition was neither identified nor studied 
as such in psychology. The relationship between direct intuition and the psycho-
logical faculty of intuition is as follows: the Husserlian noerna-noesis relation, 
which is the essence of direct intuition, underlies any kind of intuition, including the 
psychological faculty of intuition. 
In [dea.1 I, Husser! constantly refers to various kinds of intuition, such as presentive 
or eidetic. However, he does not address the factors that could be involved in the 
generation of this or that kind of intuition. In her reflections on Husserl's account, 
Tymieniecka (see the sections "Interrogation as Dialogue" and "Logos as a Horizon 
and a Category" below) views the logistics of stages in Hussed's inquiry as guided 
by the natural logic of interrogation, which is the manifestation of the logos of 
life. Intrapsychic ally, phenomenological inquiry is a sequence of the modes of 
knowledge, mediated by direct intuition. While the principal noesis-noemata 
relations are, of course, sustained throughout the process of knowledge, the structural, 
content, and temporal mosaic of the modes of knowledge creates the fabric of 
philosophical insight, which differs from one philosopher to another. 
Akin to a difference between the prophetic modes of knowledge described by Ibn 
'ArabI, the modes of knowledge too differ from one phenomenological philosopher 
to another. The modes of knowledge connect with the how, under what angle, and 
in which horizon, the direct intuition of particular thinker brings out of anonymity 
the invisible or transcendent aspects of the real. 21 Further. the inquiry will depend on 
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the degree of the transparency of the mind to direct intuition, the engagement of 
self-awareness and self-knowledge.22 As both a disciplined inquiry and a spontaneous. 
intuitively conceived process, phenomenological philosophizing is connected not 
only with streamlined cognitive processes but also with the organic growth of the 
personal insight of the philosopher, connected with a specific mental predisposition. 
This kind of reasoning can be expanded toward investigations of the origins of My 
new knowledge that has connotations of certainty and truth: discoveries spring out 
of the unique positioning of individual direct intuition. Consequently, the particular 
strategies of knowledge are rooted in the individual varieties of direct intuition. 
This creates a framework that I will now apply to Tymieniecka's phenomenology of 
life. The specifics of direct intuition in this case begin with its choice of subject. 
which is life as a phenomenal field. 
The Phenomenal Field of Life 
Tymieniecka rarely details the process of her analysis, except in her early works. 
She never deconstructs (that is, she does not engage in stripping away all meaning); 
she gives us the end result of her insight (that is, her direct insight-apperception of 
the essential relations within the flow of life). In her voluminous body of writings. 
the same process can be tracked again and again. First comes the critical suspension 
of interpretations of the subject by preceding thinkers; then, lightninglike, the holo-
graphic gestalt of the phenomenon itself and of the essential relations within it; then 
the fleshed-out description; and finally. a fully comprehended and articulated essence 
emerges out of this description, to pave the road to a new wave of recognitions. 
The internal cohesion of the vast corpus of her works is due to the innate logic of 
her inquiry and not to some kind of preliminary mental schema. As in Leibniz's 
work, Tymieniecka's path to her conclusions is not always explicit. Given the com-
bination of Tymieniecka's organic insight, the extreme breadth of her philosophical 
themes, and an unusual and original categoriL.ing, a meta-analysis of her system 
is not an easy task However, this situation inspires an additional interpretive freedom, 
a permission to go beyond the spoken and to develop one's own hypotheses of 
how this philosophy works. 
Tymieniecka begins with what first appears to be a self-evident observation: 
unless there is life. science and philosophy are impossible. Life, a commonsense 
premise of ancient philosophizing, was rejected by later thinkers in favor of starting 
points such as consciousness or existence-more sophisticated, more abstracted. or 
more available to first-person awareness. Tymieniecka's return to the primary realia 
of life breeds new philosophical discoveries. What appears at first blush to be com-
monsense reasoning may be in fact a Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason for 
attaining the truth: that is, there must be a sufficient reason for why things are as 
they are and not otherwise. If life is at the root of knowledge, then there is some-
thing in the nature of life that provides for the intelligent design of the whole: if 
contemplation begins in such a manner, the signification is already embedded in 
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life, and not bestowed on it. Designs of I ife lead Tymieniecka to the discovery of the 
Logos Omnia. The nature-nurture opposition is replaced by a picture of the ontopoi-
etic unfolding of the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive, with the self-ciphering of 
the emerging logoic possibilities. This kind of insight would be impossible if life 
were to be treated in the natural, commonsense attitude. Life in this philosophy is 
subjected to epocht\ which renders it available to direct examination and reinterpre-
tation on its own grounds. 
Underlying this monumental interpretive shift is a fully developed direct intuition 
of life- ·an innovation in Western phenomenological discourse. This intuition is not 
the natural-attitude intuition of the Presocratics and of commonsense philosophy. 
It must also be differentiated from the eidetic intuition of Tymieniecka's predecessors 
in phenomenology-a fact that she herself reflects upon. Her epoche is conducted 
on the "lived, experienced 'spectacle' within the human experience, [which is 
endowed] ... with the inward/outward dimension--the 'within ourselves' replayed 
without and the without replayed within."2~ This spectacle, which Tymieniecka calls 
"the phenomenal manifestation of life," includes both the direct intuition and the 
description of existential manifestations within one's being, such as sentience and 
the "logoic manifestation," and the overall datum of scientific investigation, traditional 
ontology, and transcendental constitution. In that. eidetic intuition IS also a part 
of life; thus, eid themselves are subjected to the intuition of life25 
This total datum of life, both conceptual and perceptual, forms the phenomenal 
field that in the phenomenology of life is the subject of the direct intuition oflife and 
of further analysis. This view of life in the broadest possible sense creates the pos-
sibility of knowing life within the phenomenological dictum of gaining knowledge 
of things as they are. According to the phenomenology of life, the particular 
instances of life can be understood only if one views them in relation to the whole 
oflife. both given in and surpassing the givenness of a particular experience. Following 
the natural unfolding of these relations through direct intuition constitutes the main 
strategy of knowledge in this philosophy. When viewed so broadly, as inclusive of 
all phenomenal manifestations of life. the totality of life is identical with its mani-
festation, and there is no essence separate from it. This phenomenal manifestation 
of life is the evidence and the measure of truth and the proof of reality, "one gigantic 
blueprint of the real."26 
Direct Intuition of a Dynamic Life-Object 
Tymieniecka emphasizes that"7; 
The crucial point of reflection tilal could claim to be "phenomenological" is the overt or tacit 
assumption of immediate. direct evidence which lies at the roots of all human experience: direct 
evidence accompanying states of affairs, objective formation by the mind, emotional 
complexes, intentional acts ... 
As we established, this direct evidence in Tymieniecka's approach is the 
phenomenal field of life. By Tymieniecka's own analysis, none of her predecessors 
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in the phenomenology of life dissociated eidetic intuition from the intuition of 
life. 28 She accomplishes this important move with regard to four aspects: intuition 
acting in the discerning act that separates the intuition of life from other kinds of 
intuition; the broadly inclusive presentive intuition embracing all manifestations of 
life; the intuition engaged in identification of the universal structures of life, as a 
vehicle of Tymieniecka's interrogation; and presentive intuition underling the acts 
of seeing these unconditionally universal truths, which is another kind of presentive 
intuition engaged in Tymieniecka's interrogation. The intuition discerning the 
universal structures of life is analogous to the eidetic intuition with regard to its 
abstracting quality; but even then, in its abstraction it retains fidelity to its substra-
tum per se, which is life and not the life of ideas. Other types of intuition are unique 
to Tymieniecka's inquiry. 
In her earlier writings, Tymieniecka describes analytic steps that appear to engage 
the above aspects of intuition sequentially; in the later works, she replaces these 
descriptions by atemporal, synthetic gestalen where historicity is a part of structure. 
Yet another important feature of her intuition is its focus on the dynamism of life 
as an intentional objecLln her predecessors, across the hoard, acts of direct intuition 
tend to capture only what is static29: 
Given the spontaneous tendency of the speculative mind to seek a point of vantage from 
which the all-embracing intuition could be obtained, the cognilive Illode of the mind is led 
to focus on the static. stationary circuits of the artifacts of the Iifeworld that the human mind 
itself establishes. 
Tymieniecka's discovery, enabled by the positioning of her direct intuition, is 
that the phenomena of life only appear static. because of objectification by the 
mind. Therefore, the correct philosophical procedure. which would resolve countless 
gnoseological conflicts in philosophy. is to focus on the dynamisms and interrelat-
edness of "virtual moments" of being. 30 Neither is it the case that "a statement of 
fact or state of affairs ever remains completely enclosed within itself, [but itl refers 
always with necessity to some factor or factors needed for further completion ... 
and ... to its 'possible' but not definitely indicated continuation ... "3l The positioning 
of Tymieniecka's intuition is such that it captures the process-that is, the constant 
evolution-of the field of life. 
Besides the general horizon of life, and besides the ongoing changes within 
it, she intuits and follows life's growth cone, its ontopoietic front-that is, the 
fine clearing in which the new "virtualities" are born. Even though experien-
tially these virtualities can appear as deployed from the "Ground of Being" of 
transcendental subjectivity. their origin is not in pure transcendental conscious-
ness but within the Logos of every preceding stage of the unfolding life.'2 One 
might say that Tymieniecka's dialogue with Logos is conducted with a high 
degree of intimacy; she is always connected to the spectacle in which life cre-
ates its never-ending arabesques. Several vistas appear to he present in this 
tracking of the Logos of Life. Think of how one perceives calligraphy: stepping 
back, one can appreciate the whole completed piece, but one can also closely 
follow the pen of the calligrapher as the design is created, or one can track the 
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lines of the calligraphy in their developing motion. The perspective one takes 
depends on one's personal cognitive style. In Tymieniecka's inquiry, her atten-
tion is on all three aspects-but then, as a master artist, she penetrates down to 
the alchemy governing the very flow of the ink. 
It is clear that insights into these dynamic structures happen very quickly for 
Tymieniecka, the moment she "looks." Because she goes directly to this end result 
in her description of the functioning of her direct intuition, and because she does not 
have an introspectionist agenda of letting us into the inner mechanics of her mind, 
her insight may not be convincing at its face. The reader herself has to develop that 
"gift of the gods," direct intuition, in order to follow Tymieniecka's philosophy 
effectively, which otherwise may appear to be merely a set of mentally derived 
schemata or pure metaphors.}3 Tymieniecka's philosophy is phenomenology, so the 
mastering of one's own direct intuition plays a very important role in developing an 
understanding of her. One has either to turn inward and develop the same direction 
of phenomenological intuition or else to give up and disregard her phenomenology 
as a mere set of abstractions. But they are not abstractions; quite the contrary: they 
are descriptions. Direct intuition is always central to her method. 
The horizon of her intuition is different from the horizons of preceding think-
ers not only with regard to life being her object of focus and the su bject matter of 
her research, or with regard to her ability to register the dynamisms of life, but 
in particular with regard to her capacity of capturing the very process of emer-
gence. I refer to this quality of her intuition as an "ontopoietic intuition.")4 This 
intuition seizes upon the novum, the emergence as it happens through the deploy-
ment of the virtualities of life-that is, the warp and woof of that very creative 
matrix that Tymieniecka describes in a variety of ways in her writings. In the his-
tory of insight, this is a unique positioning of awareness, even by the high standards 
of Sufism.') Instances of such awareness are described only in the Hindu meta-
physics of Kundalini Tantra, where one can find a set of meditations on the 
dynamic origins of things.'6 Psychological changes leading to the rise of a similar 
kind of developmental awareness take place in the psychological process of 
spiritual emergence. J7 
Both in spiritual emergence and in the processes described in Kundalini Tantra, 
the emergence of new perceptions has to be accompanied by the rise of new mean-
ings. As new energies appear. life has to give rise to new rationalities as well; 
otherwise, there is existential or cognitive conflict. The coherence of the self 
depends on that simultaneous transformation of being and of understanding. In 
her own philosophical way, Tymieniecka discovers the larger ontological under-
pinnings of this individualized process of becoming3~ Neither pure eidetic essen-
tialism nor the opposing philosophical stance, the constructivist orientation toward 
individual mastery of experience, provides a ground for adequate insight into this 
process. It is only in Tymieniecka's idea of ciphering that the emergence of new 
meaning, within life and out of life's own creative depth, is adequately captured: 
"[W]e dwell in ciphering itself.")9 A human being endows every cmergence from 
the life-matrix (i.e., life's "dynamic flux [that] articulates itself')40 with a 
significance uniquely its own. In this scheme of things, Tymieniecka's intuition 
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serves as a medium for logoic self-interrogation, as Logos both posits and 
reflects, via Tymieniecka's awareness in her human condition, life's dynamic flux. 
Tymieniecka's intuition and logos are interconnected. in the cognitive realm as 
well as in concrete becoming. 
Interrogation as Dialogue 
Out of all the possibilities available in the phenomenal field, at every given moment 
direct intuition highlights a certain horizon, creates a new clearing. One can imagine 
a scenic drive with shifting vistas. 41 In systematic phenomenological investigations, 
the spontaneous flux of these horizons is intentionally controlled to meet the demands 
of research agenda. In the case of the phenomenology of life, the sequencing of 
those vistas and the direction of the intuitional grasping of the phenomena obey 
the naturally unfolding self-articulation of life through the mind of the philosopher. 
Tymieniecka's second philosophical category, the ontopoietic Logos of Life, reflects 
the quality of these transactions as alive, and their sui-generis unfolding combined 
with logically intelligible self-ordering. 
Perhaps in the messiness of experience life may appear chaotic. Therefore, logoic 
self-ordering has to be discerned through the logical interconnectedness of emerging 
themes, in dialectical relations between ontological and epistemological foci of 
inquiry, and in the repetitive cycles of epoche, examination of prereflective data, 
reflective conclusions, and further epoche. According to Tymieniecka, a somewhat 
similar intelligence guides Husserl's thinking: for example, his assumed intentional 
shift from ontology to epistemology is not deliberate but is invariable by the innate 
logic of his inquiry. Themes are not derived theoretically but are intuited in the 
prerefiective horizon; this can be traced in any philosophy that uses the epistemology 
of direct intuition, be it the twelfth-century illuminationism of Suhrawardi or the 
twentieth-century phenomenology of Husser! or of Merleau-Ponty. Thus the inter-
rogation appears logical, because there is an implicit logic (logos) embedded in 
direct intuition of the prerefiective.42 The filum Ariadnae that leads Tymieniecka 
through the labyrinth of life is linked to this implicit logic: sustained attention to 
life's phenomena in their fullness, with inward and outward expanses, brings the 
logos of life to full visibility. 
I have already mentioned that the notion of sentience is another key factor in 
Tymieniecka's recategorizing of philosophy. To my understanding, the term "sentience" 
points to the simultaneity and sameness of knowing and being in its experiential 
referent, which is available both as a property of subjective experience and in obser-
vations of the networks of life.4' Phenomenologically the same faculty of conscious 
experience is captured in the notion of "presence" in Suhrawardi, or the notion of 
noesis in Husser!: that is, the percipient quality of experience per se. 
The conflation of traditionally separate ontological and epistemological aspects 
of inquiry in Tymieniecka's metaphysics is not theoretical but immediate. This existen-
tial unity leads her to the discovery of the principle of the unity-of-all-thcre-is-alive 
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and to the recognition of the cardinal feature of life. individuation in the human 
condition. 44 Because sentience is found on both sides of the human subject/phenomenal 
field of life duet, the interrogation is indeed a dialogue. Tymieniecka's terminology 
reflects the live dialogical quality of this inquiry in such usages as "self-articulation" 
(of life or logos) and "interrogation," as opposed to terms such as "examination," 
"reflection," or "analysis." 
In Husserl's noesis-noema schema, awareness is on the subject side of the phe-
nomenal field; according to the idea of intentional consciousness, there is always a 
directedness of awareness. The phenomenal field can be experienced as both actively 
seen and passively received. 45 It appears that in Tymieniecka's modus of philoso-
phizing, engagement with the phenomenal field of life is more than a receptive or 
active process of an ego. The philosopher is in dialogue with the senticnt Other, a 
pervasive presence that inspires every motion in the interrogation. The logos of 
life-that is, the sentience, impetus, and internal logiclintelligence/meaning al the 
core of manifold patterns of life-attains its self-articulation through this dialogue. 
Since logos totally informs the phenomenal manifestation of life, there is nothing 
outside its domain.46 Philosophical interrogation becomes a part of its self-articulation 
via the human condition, as an intrapsychic manifestation. (See the section "A 
Meditation on Sentience: Entering One's Own Logoic Manifestation," below.) 
In this view, empirical life is nO! a set of particular existences thar are separate 
from their metaphysical essence but is a manifestation identical with its essence. 
As long as one can make oneself present to the flow of life, the inquiry can partner 
with Logos itself. The inquiry is then taken over by Logos as the process of its self-
disclosure, conceived within the logoic scheme of things. Tymieniecka's interrogation 
is both dialogical with and a manifestation of the Logos of Life, an intrapsychic 
manifestation.47 
This dialogical quality is enhanced by Tymieniecka's constant reflection on the 
process. In theory, systematic phenomenology has to attend to the prereflective 
level of consciousness. However, the actual practice of inquiry involves shifts from 
prereflective data to reflective data, to logical conclusions, to synthesis, and then 
back to the prereflective data of experience. This hermeneutics in phenomenologi-
cal inquiry is frequently taken for granted. In contrast, Tymieniecka constantly 
identifies the procedures she engages in and the horizons she navigates.48 As she 
states. "Through the embodiment of beingness. the logos of life performs the cru-
cial operation of life-its p()sitioning."4~ While navigating the constantly switching 
vistas of life, she always takes her bearings. This self-reflection is also one of the 
features of her interrogation that contributes to its radical nature. The fact that 
consciousness constantly switches its horizons is well known in phenomenology; 
however, the generative aspect of this shifting has not previously been satisfyingly 
examined. Nor has satisfying examination been done in regard to the systemic 
contexts of the horizons of inquiry. Tymieniecka's interrogation pays special atten-
tion to the positioning of the locus of her inquiry. Says Tymieniecka: "[Tlbe 
acquired findings of today's philosophy lack universal significance because it is 
still necessary to verify them as being part and parcel of the vast context to which 
they belong and in which they find grounding.";o This fidelity to the substratum of 
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her interrogation makes phenomenology of life adequate to things themselves, 
more so than in any of the preceding systems. 
Thus, engaging in philosophical enterprise, for Tymieniecka, becomes a constant 
act of receptivity to logos as the latter releases its prompts. Because of this need 
for attention to larger, systemic contexts, the logic of this interrogation is not the 
dialectical of pure ideas but takes place within the complexity of the onlopoietic, 
self-creative activity of logos-which includes but is not limited to the dynamics of 
ideas. This complexity leads to specific distinctions: for example, the thematization 
of life, as opposed to the thematization of being or knowing, assumes an ongoing 
integration rather than a focus on dichotomies. Another key feature is transcending 
the aporia between the "fleetingness of being and its essence," or between the logic 
of essences and the logic of contradiction. 51 This unifying. holistic impulse. where 
the philosopher's presence does not deconstruct the fabric of perception but rather 
restores the wholeness of living through the process of inquiry, is characteristic of 
Tymieniecka's philosophy. Receptivity is a distinctive feature of her presence. 
She functions as a receptacle for what already is, reversing the pathos of philosophy 
from the agency of focused inquiry to the receptivity of open awareness toward the 
acts of being-which are, at the same time, acts of knowing. Her epistemology and 
her ontology are indivisible, as the "known" replaces the "knowing." 
This receptivity, and the subordination of agency to presence, helps Tymieniecka 
to accomplish the phenomenological reduction of phenomenology itself called for 
by Husser\. By letting the phenomenological inquiry guide itself from the inside 
out, Tymieniecka uncovers the logic of the inward/outward articulation of the 
networks of self-cognizing life. 
Logos as a Horizon and a Category 
Tymieniecka makes logos into a major presence in her philosophy. In a sense, all 
of her philosophy is about logos.52 Logos for her is the Logos Omnia. the main 
player in the continuum of the world, the self and the sacred. My task in this review 
is to explicate, or at least to bring to partial visibility, the strategy of knowledge by 
which Tymicniecka attains this recognition. Her logos is not an abstract formation 
of the mind but a described intuition whereby Logos is the main horizon of her 
direct explorations of the phenomenal field of life. Her interpretation of Logos in 
some aspects overlaps with Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's understanding of it. 
which is logos as a logic of inquiry, or logic in the temporal dimension of phenom-
enal flow. However, in Tymieniecka's work. logos is not used in this rather narrow 
sense, nor it is replanted into her philosophy from ancient mystical or philosophi-
cal contexts. Derived from sentience, her notion of logos is inclusive of both intu-
itjon and logic; it is not a thing but a dynamism; and it is responsible for the ordering 
of life-in other words, her logos is indeed the "verb unifying and discriminat-
ing."l' Not a property of the mind bestowed on the inert nature in the move of 
signification, this logos is inseparable from life and is an essential principle in life 
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receiving its full expression in the human condition. Thus. the recognition of this 
unified intelligence is the means of overcoming the philosophical crisis of reason. 
In order to clarify the distinctions between the principle of logos in the phenom-
enology oflife and the concept of reason in prior philosophy. I will refer to Husserl's 
distinction between logic as understood in the framework of logical psychologism 
[a position in philosophy of logic which derives the facts oflogic from psychologi-
callifel and logic as understood in his account of pure logic. The properties of pure 
logic are not found in the physical, spatiotemporal world, and cannot be experi-
enced or captured by experimental methods. "Pure logic is uniquely characterizable 
in terms of a set of special non- natural or ideal kinds to which LP has no ontologi-
cal access (since LP has access only to the physicaL spatiotemporal world) or 
explanatory access."54In Tymieniecka's view. there are various types of intelligence 
that spring forth in ontopoietic sequences of life. Life has its own logic of sequenc-
ing and positioning these rationalities among its other potentialities. Based on the 
fact that life is inherently intelligent, albeit not in an ordinary reason's ways. it is 
possible to infer that both natural logic and pure logic will be instances in the mani-
festations ofhfe's intelligence, pure logic emerging in the human condition. Since 
Tymieniecka views sciences and scientific discoveries as a part of the overall phe-
nomenal field of life, the multiple forms of intelligence found in scientific experi-
ments will be the expressions of logos. 
Contrasted with logic as means of knowledge, direct intuition cannot be differ-
entiated with regard to its "natural" or "ideal" properties. In Suhrawardi's account, 
knowledge by presence ontologically precedes logic (which he proves logically), which 
leads to elimination of the distinction between ideal and natural, essential and 
lived. Instead, what is manifested and lived is identical with essential and ideal, 
as the latter is apparent in manifestation. The only difference between these principles 
will be in the orders of apparew:y. Tymieniecka goes even further in this, since for 
her the essence is identical with manifestations. They will be distinct only in the 
ways of how, when, and where these modes can be intuited, but they will be the 
same in their ontological status. Ideal and natural are separate in their positioning, 
degree, and proportion in life. but unified in Logos Omnium. 
The logos of life unfolds in ontopoietic time. Time is the form for logoic self-
articulation; life is the field for logoic onropoietic expression. Like a dance that 
can be only semiotically separated from the dancer, logos can be only semioticaily 
separated from life and ontologically remains in identity with it. Logos is embedded 
in the patterns of life and cannot be conceived as separate from it. cannot be viewed 
as some kind of transcendental principle in its unreachable abode. Nor is it a power 
beyond the reach of reason. Even though one may overlook its manifest significance. 
the process of the ontopoietic expression of Logos is revealing rather than 
concealing.55 Whether or not the logoic designs are available to description depends 
on whether the intuition of a given think.er can be in touch with the horizon of logoic 
self-articulation. 
Logos is found-brought out of anonymity-within one's own logoic manifestation 
first; then one's intuition has to enter the circuits of bios. zoe, and kosmos progres-
sively and regressively encircling it, and then lastly enter into the inner workings 
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of the primeval Logos, dynamic, self-constitutive, and self-directed. To reiterate, 
there are three steps to her understanding of Logos: first, the intrapsychic discovery 
of logoic manifestation-sentience56-second, the tracking of the works of logos in 
life, in many unfolding networks, which gives rise to what I call Tymieniecka's 
"process phenomenology"; and third, penetration into the process of creation, the 
primeval Logos, lmaginatio Creatrix. These three vistas create the horizon of Logos 
in Tymieniecka's thought. In the remainder of this article, I will attempt to give a 
more detailed overview of all three. 
A Meditation on Sentience: Entering One's Own Logoic 
Manifestation 
Tymieniecka points to the act of entering one's own logoic manifestation but does 
not elaborate on it. This absence of detailing on the internal procedure appears to be 
within philosophical tradition: that's how Husser! and other phenomenologists treat 
their own inquiries. For example, they describe their epoche, or the first-person 
process of analytic reflection, but do not specify how exactly they did it: that is, 
what intrapsychic operations the procedure implied. Generally, these procedures are 
quite accessible to a reader and easily available to direct intuition. By comparison, 
because of the shift in the positioning of the direct intuition characteristic of the 
phenomenology of life, these procedures are not always self-evident and require 
additional deciphering. 
The clues Tymieniecka does give indicate that this internal manifestation of 
Logos is not that of being distilled of its adjuncts. in spite of the fact that this or that 
conception of being is a frequent ground for ontological insights.~7 For comparison, 
I have again to tum to philosophies that maintain an intimate relationship with full 
potentialities of experience, as such an approach is charac teristic of Tymieniecka's 
own work. For example, in the experiential religious philosophy of Advaita Vedanta, 
unqualified pure being has to be discovered within one's own experience, as the 
result of a specific type of reduction away from the phenomena and toward the 
subject-ego.58 Thereupon, the experience of being is turned into a metaphysical 
principle of unitive being. However, this is a result of mental reflection and not a state 
of affairs within the given.59 Tymienieckian Logos also has its experiential manifesta-
tion: sentience. Sentience is embedded within the natural experience and is realized 
through the advancement of discrimination based on direct intuition. It is not reduced 
to the ego pole, but rather it is evenly distributed throughout the sphere of awareness 
without any intentional vector inherent to it. Intuitively realized as a faculty of 
life, sentience is a protocapacity of both reason and intuition, the basic "known" of 
life. Logos, derived from sentience in its multifold manifestations, is intuition 
and reason in one, or, metaphorically, the intelligence of mind and heart united. 
In the human condition, sentience is by what one naturally apperceives and 
apprehends. In philosophical interrogation aimed at the general principles of life, 
reason and intuition function as one integrative faculty. By comparison, Islamic 
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existential philosophy embraces a principle of the unification of all the faculties of 
knowledge for a philosophy propec similar unification is found in early Husserl, 
who grounds logic in the direct intuition. 60 
Consequently, the logoic intelligence of life, and sentience, are the two sides of 
one coin, one principle available in direct intuition but viewed in different contexts. 
Sentience is a logoic sentience; logos is a sentient Logos. By entering one's own 
logoic manifestation and tracing it through the phenomenal field, one can experien-
tially recognize the absolute simulLaneity of sentience, experience, and meaning. 
Possibly this simultaneity contributes to Tymieniecka's understanding of the unity of 
being and knowing in experience. One may conclude that direct, immediate apper-
ception of sentience unmodified by any reflection indeed composes the foundation of 
Tymieniecka's understanding of Logos. Sentience is fully experiential, but it is not an 
experience of pure being (as described above) or of pure awareness-and those two 
are easily separated from each other via the mental exercises involved in any reduc-
tion-based path.61 Logos is realized not in the distillation of aspects of experience hut 
in a discerning recognition of the intrinsic self-radiance of experience. The appercep-
tion of sentience as a radiance inherent to all phenomena is not a feature of altered 
perception but is the substance and real nature of any perception.62 One may also 
propose that, for Tymieniecka, the contents of her experience are constituted of 
logoic sentience, whence her receptive welcoming of all modalities of life. Direct 
awareness of this self-radiance of logos in life appears to be what leads Tymieniecka 
to her articulation of Logos as sentient, to her ontology, and [0 her disputing Kant's 
and Husserl's theory of knowledge, which is limited to subject-object intentionality. 
From the vantage point of all-pervasive logoic sentience, the entire domain of life 
carries the potential for knowledge. It is the expression of logoic sentience as con-
sciousness that occupies a particular horizon in which the subject and the object are 
matched in a manner prompted by the rest of life's network.61 
Thus, one's own logoic manifestation relates to the intrapsychic presence of a 
sentient principle that exceeds the limits of individuality. This Logos is convincing 
also because Tymieniecka traces its functioning in the emergence of scientific data, 
which operate as evidence and are not contradictory to metaphysics. Logos, pervasive 
in all expressions of life, actualizes itself through countless avenues in the enormous 
diversity of life.64 Correctly understood, these two categories, life and Logos, initi-
ate the formulation of a framework that resolves a tension between metaphysics and 
science. 
From sentience per se, Tymieniecka expands attention to the functional, structural, 
generative, and phenomenal levels of logoic self-actualizaton-all of which are 
vistas for her direct intuition.65 This wholeness is not of the all-embracing eidetic 
kind; rather, it is determined via intuition of the logoic manifestation: that is, it 
includes all the possibilities of awareness available in the human condition. 
Her categorizing is phenomenologically descriptive: "We reach that lcore of the 
deployment of logoic force in life's dynamic flux] through the phenomenological 
investigations pursued by Husserl and his numerous distinct followers. Phenomenology, 
as the most probing philosophical inquiry in history, has brought us to the heart of 
the logos itself."66 
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Process Phenomenology: Logos in the Dynamic Flux of Life 
In the next round of examination, the focus is on how logos actualizes itself in life's 
ongoing self-creation and self-constitution. It is from this apparent relationship 
between life and logos, that the rest of the vision in the phenomenology of life 
develops. For example, in regard to the categories of unity and differentiation, 
Tymieniecka states: "We must seek the differentiation of living beings not in their 
participation in the world, but in their ontopoietic process as much as their integrating 
or gathering reach."67 The articulation of the sentience of Logos at the very outset in 
her philosophical system sets up the focus on the ever-present ontopoiesis of life 
in its developmental dynamics and for uncovering the connections between life's 
different modes. There emerges a sensible system from what seem to be chaotic 
modalities of life. 
Ontopoiesis, another central category in Tymieniecka's philosophy, is the self-
articulating and creative activity of life, expressed in its ongoing logoic orderly 
self-constitution. It provides for the relationship between the manifestation (life) 
and its inherent ordering principle (Logos). The generating matrix of life supports 
the vital networks that unfold into the stages of sharing-in-life and other constitutive 
phases. Tymieniecka uncovers different modalities in the forces that orchestrate the 
stages of life, such as gathering, distribution, discrimination, conjoining, bringing 
into integration, and so forth, that accomplish the purposes of each particular stage.68 
She describes both the concrete points of the matrix and the entire spread of 
the originating order. She also delineates the main lines of investigation into life's 
ordering, such as the discovery of life's individuating beingness, the creative 
emergencies of ontopoiesis, the human creative condition-that is, the capacity to 
endow with significance and act upon initiative-the emergence of self-awareness 
in the agency of life, the emergence of the self-directing and all-overseeing mind, 
and all the phases of the human condition, such as gathering, transformation, radiation, 
and so on. Hence she conceives "the ontopoietic design, [whereby 1 we avoid the 
reduction of one type ofrationality to another."69 
The orientation toward the process, toward ongoing origin and development, 
follows the thread of sentience in all instances of life and influences Tymienieckian 
understanding of logos: in contrast to the predominance of static categories in 
philosophy after the ancients, Tymieniecka's categorical apparatus captures what 
is dynamic.70 As the "immovable mover," the "prime cause" and an entelechial prin-
ciple, the logos in Tymieniecka's philosophy is close to the theas of ancient Greek 
philosophers. By the same token, logos is in effect a principle of activity rather than 
a noun principle of thingness. Logos's facticity is in action and relation, not in just 
being there, so its self-predicating semiotics is verblike. 
The logoic focus at the core of Tymieniecka's interrogation instructs her to state 
thaCI 
it is indispensable to envisage [life] from two perspectives: one may take in its surface 
phenomenal manifestation in its formal, structural, constitutive fashion, or one may peer 
into the depths of energies, forces, dynamisms that carry it relentlessly onward. 
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We can see how these two perspectives are actualized in the latter two stages of 
logole expression, logos in its unfolding in life and the primeval Logos of creative 
imagination. In the ongoing processes of life, logos is intuited in its surface phe-
nomenal manifestation; and in the analysis of imagination, Tymicniecka penetrates 
into the depths of the energies that carry it forward. This (irst domain. the overall 
surface-process orientation. can be identilled as "process phenomenology" emerging 
out of the verblike. self-predicating semiotics of the Logos. 
In a process-phenomenological analysis, intuition captures life as a dynamic 
force of its own that prompts its continuing advance. The focus of intuition and 
interrogation differentiates and expands to include both the structural or constitutive 
horizon and the dynamk of energies and forces. following the sentient logos 
through the palterns of life, Tymieniecka tinds that "[allthough we apprehend and 
predicate the status of life by the relatively static form it lakes. it is in the energies 
and play of forces that it takes ilS shape ill the flux of beeomlng."n Thus philosophy 
faces a difl1cul! manifold task, as "the givenness of life, which in its manifestation 
extends over mUltiple spheres of significance, [cannot] be brought adequately to 
disclosure and clarified in underslanding by anyone procedure of philosophical 
enquiry."7] The method of inquiry, therefore. cannot be limited to this or thal type of 
logic. which would "inevitahly meet a dead end,"" Logic. whic:h is limited by its 
situatedness in life. cannot gru::.p all life as fhe latter expands in all directions 
and ''refracts its modalities and their apparatus into innumerable rays thai flow con-
currently onwards:'7~ The dynamic engagement of direct intuition of the constantly 
shifting forms and horizons of life IS the most adequate method. 
This process-orientation permits Tymieniecka not only to identify the structures 
persisting in this dynamic expanse but 10 track the positioning of the human condition 
in the ontopoietic cycle of life. The cycle of interrogation begins with life, whicb is 
discovered to be self-individualizing. This lead.., to a realization that the of life 
is engaged in ontopoiesis, self-ereative activity, giving rise to different spheres of 
self-individualization, such as the spheres of energies and shaping, out of which 
transcendence of the natural order in the virtuality of the soul emerges. The soul 
articulates the outward/inward expanse or the nature of life and engages in the 
differentiation of self from Other and the emergence of a new virtuality, the spirit. 
Then the spirit begins its descent, presencing the spheres of energies and shaping, 
presencing the circles of ontopoiesis, prl:!sencing the very Logos of Life, and. finally, 
pn;~senclng the self-individualizing life. Thus the cycle is completed, as Tymieniecka 
both follows the Iogoic flow in analysis and breaks free from it by establishing 
herself as a locus of logoie self-reflection. The nonreducible presence of the world, 
and self as the differentiating principle, define the scope of the analysis. The driving 
force of this prOces~ phenomenology on the "surface level," as a motivator in the 
human mind that pn:lVides the mediumistic agency for the inquiry, is the search for 
truth. The natural belief of a human being. our basic existential trust. 
consists of our mllll: !lummi conviction of the indubitable l'O}1Stant background of our realit~ 
insofar as our life-indlviduali,ing proce,s is simultaneously crystallizing the "('U1ward" 
frlllUcwork of our existence "'Ilhin the world and manifesting "inwardly" the enlire spread 
of alit vital. existential and .::reattVc virtualities as Ihcy may unfold. 
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Further analysis leads Tymieniecka to recognize that '"the search for truth is the 
constructive device intrinsic to the logos' ontopoietic manifestation in life."n Thus, 
the basic drive pushing the search for knowledge inherent to the human condition is 
discovered to be visible inwardly within this condition as a search for truth and 
outwardly in the larger scheme of things as a logoic ontopoietic manifestation. 
The completing brushstroke in this sketch of Tymieniecka's strategies of knowl-
edge must take us into the thicket of life's self-poiesis, into the intuition of logoic 
imagination. 
Intuition of Imagination 
Although the metaphysical, phenomenological and existential aspects ofTymieniecka's 
concept of imagination have been analyzed by Mardas,78 the methodological aspects 
ofTymieniecka's treatment of this feature of Logos merit further analysis. Imaginario 
Creatrix is the most enticing and esoteric (in the Straussian sense) principle in 
Tymieniecka's thought. Tymieniecka's conception of imagination plays a crucial 
role in her understanding of two spheres of life, the overall generative activity of 
Logos as Imaginatio Crealrix and the emergence of the human condition. In the 
latter, imagination is given a role more important than that of reason-which distin-
guishes Tymieniecka's phenomenology from the rest of Western philosophy. 
Tymieniecka views imagination as the process by which the novum manifests 
in the phenomenal field in different ways. Imagination in its inward aspect is a 
psychological quality in the human condition and transpires in its outward aspects 
as Imaginatio Crearrix, the principle of imagination that provides for the emergence 
of the novum out of the otherwise linear unfOlding of the entelechial momentum of 
life. Logoic imagination is the very medium that brings about the actual fabric of 
life out of "nonlife," brings the human condition out of bios, mediates ciphering, 
and provides for the presence of the human condition within the bounds of life. 
Imagination is connected with the very creation of the fabric of life in the same way 
that a spider creates a spider's web out of its living body. 
In phenomenological studies in general, imagination has been poorly researched, 
as the intrapsychic workings of imagination do not surrender easily to the grasp 
of direct intuition. In Buddhist meditation, which is by far the most advanced intro-
spective enterprise in human history, creative imagination is viewed as the function 
that is both the most difficult to control and the most difficult to "see through" in the 
pursuit of truth. 79 The same is true of the perspective on imagination in Islamic 
metaphysics.80 And even when the generative aspect of imagination can be taken 
under some level of conscious control, by the most advanced meditators, the process 
of imagining-that is. the generative act of consciousness-remains hidden to 
direct intuition. To account for this fact, I suggest that direct intuition per se may 
have a phenomenal nature. This implies that direct intuition, when it is used in the 
phenomenological method in the ways I described in the analysis above, is a faculty 
pertaining to the human condition only. As such, direct intuition itself can be viewed 
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as a product of the generative aspect of imagination. or a faculty ontogenetically 
posterior to the logoic Imaginatio Creatrix, or both. If this is so. any attempt to 
capture the origin of direct intuition by means of direct intuition is somewhat like 
an attempt to touch the surface of water in order to feel how smooth it is: though 
available to visual perception up to that point, the smoothness of the sUliace disappears 
upon being touched. The act of examination alters the natural picture. 
In order to phenomenologically capture the ontological aspects of imagination, 
Tymieniecka first situates imagination within the lOgOlC scheme. Then she examines 
it through its relationships. She approaches imagination through the clearings created 
by all other orders of life. from its relation to the biological apparatus ofthe organic 
brain to its relations to will, action, reason, and other virtualities of the human con-
dition. Imagination both sets forth the new virtualities and rationalities of life and 
serves as a cognitive organ, a vehicle by which Logos can see its own potentialities. 
Says Tymieniecka: "In entering the very workings of the Logos through creative 
acts that participate in them. we discover the very language of the Logos in action, 
along with the new set of semantic categories that it reveals."~1 Direct intuition 
appears to glimpse Imaginatio Crealrix only in relations and indirectly through its 
fruits; on some level, imagination retains its mysterious character, 
Conclusions 
I am completing the analysis of mental operations, which are engaged in Tymienieeka's 
jouruey of knowledge. with a sense of internal stillness and gratitude. Perhaps the 
above set of mental acts can be viewed as an algorithm of philosophical knowledge. 
1he technical aspects of the meJllOd are nonexistent in Tymieniecka's case, but her 
general gnoseological stance is distinct and unique: it is the nOVrlnl of direct 
inlUition. 
In my analysis of Tymieniecka's use of direct intuition, I made use of the noema-
noesis theory of intentional consciousness. However, as I mentioned in the discussion 
above, Tymieniecka herself extensively criticizes that theory's claims to universal 
applicability; Tymieniecka's broad contextualizing eliminates any doubt that imagi-
nation as a cognitive function and as Imaginatia Crealrix is much more prevalent 
in life than the intentional acts of consciousness. Therefore I have to establish a 
delimiter to my own analysis: positioning direct intuition within the conceptual 
network of intentional consciousness limits the possibilities for understanding the 
former and semantically narrows the clearing within which imagination can be 
fully understood as part of one's own logoic manifestation. Juxtaposed with the fact 
that Tymieniecka's discovery of the crucial role of imagination in ontopoietic 
networks is direct-intuition-based-What else could it be'!~these points lead me to 
believe that the very framework for the analysis of direct intuition needs to be even-
tually revised, It is possible that our concept of direct intuition. which is the major 
vehicle of Tymieniecka's insight. itself needs further clarification in order for us to 
understand Tymieniecka's method in her discovery of the role of imagination, 
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reading of phenomenologically derived descriptions as metaphors or mental >chemata 
happens especially often in interpretations of mysticism, as is discussed in Louchakova 
and Warner 2003. 
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34. For more on the habitual fixation of attention on the "stages;' see Tymieniecka 2009: 34. 
35. One can find referenccs to the dynamism of unity in ProcJus; however, these are not philosophi-
cally developed. For more on Proclus, see Corbin 1976: see also Chinick 1994. Another philoso-
pher paying attention to dynamic aspects of reality is Whitehead; the comparative analysis of 
his philosophy with Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life has yet to be done. 
36. Singh 1979. For more on intentional consciousness in Kundalini Yoga, see Louchakova 2004: 
88 n. 220. 
37. For more on ontopoietic intuition in spiritual emergence, see Louchakova 2007a. 
38. For more on the ontology of becoming. see Tymieniecka 2004. 
39. Tymieniecka 2000: 19. 
40. Tymieniecka 200Y: 16. 
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45. For phenomenological reduction as a praxis. see Depraz 1999. 
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disclosure of God: Chillick 1998; al-Attas 1990. 
48. Cf. analogous attention to states and stagt!s of experience in Sufi sm: al-Attas 1990. 
49. Tymienieeka 2009: xxviii. 
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